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Decision Reversing Bradley Conviction Centers on Judge's Exclusion of Witnesses
Posted on Thursday, October 18 @ 10:36:42 EDT by jfbailey
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WPCNR WHITE PLAINS LAW JOURNAL FOR THE RECORD. October 18, 2012:
The decision of Appellate Judges Ruth C. Balkin, Ariel E. Belen, L. Priscilla Hall and Robert J.Miller reversing the conviction of former Mayor Adam Bradley of White Plains, for attempted assault 3rd degree, harassment, 2nd degree,2 counts and criminal contempt, 2nd degree in a domestic dispute involving his wife-- by a 3 to 1 decision issued Wednesday concludes that
"Upon reviewing the record here, we are statisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence. However, given the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial."
"...we conclude that the Supreme Court improperly precluded the defendent from adducing testimony which showed that his wife told others that the bedroom door was accidentally closed on her hand. The proffered testimony was in 'substantial contradiction' to his (Bradley's) wife's testimony that the defendent intentionally slammed the door on her hand and that she never told anyone that her hand had been caught in the bedroom door accidentally, and it was, therefore, sufficiently inconsistent to be relevant to the issue of the wife's credibility. Furthermore, testimony as to whether the defendant's wife told others that the bedroom door was accidentally closed on her hand was not related to a collateral matter at all, but rather, it went directly to the heart of the most contested aspect of the case -- the defendant's (Bradley's) intent. Under the circumstances present here, the preclusion of such material and exculpatory evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, the judgments must be reversed and the matters remitted to thr Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a new trial."
Presiding Judge Ruth Balkin dissented, writing, "The foundation necessary for impeachment of a witness by prior inconsistent statements on a material issue is straightforward and long settled. The impeaching party must first ask the witness if he or she made the prior statement. A general question about prior statements is not sufficient; the witness's attention must be directed to the time and place of the prior statement, the person to whom it was made and the substance of it...If the witness denies or claims not to remember, having made the prior statement, the impeaching party may then present extrinsic evidence of it."
"In this case, the defendant's claim pertains to prior statements the complainant allegedly had made to three people, two civilians and a detective. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the complainant whether she had ever told "anyone" that the incident on February 28th (2010) was an accident or whether she was not sure how it happened or was confused about what had happened. Defense counsel failed to specify the dates the complainant was alleged to have made these prior statements or to whom they were made. Thus the foundation for extrinsic evidence of the alleged prior inconsistent statements was inadequate. Therefore, contrary to the holding of my colleagues, the trial court did not err in precluding the defendant from eliciting, as (witness) impeachment evidence, testimony from the two civilians and the detective about the complainant's alleged prior inconsistent statements."
Judge Balkin's written dissent also observed,
"My colleagues hold that the evidence was admissable not only as impeachment of the complainant, but also as affirmative evidence that the defendant did not act intentionally. In other words, although the proffered evidence was admittedly hearsay, my colleagues hold that the defendant's right to present a defense overrode the rules of evidence. I disagree. It is true in some circumstances the right to present a defense will override the hearsay rule. But those circumstances are rare, as examination of the cases cited by the majority makes clear; most of the reversals concerned erroneous exclusion of reliable hearsay evidence that another person had admitted committing the crime for which the defendant was on trial.(cites cases) None involved the situation presented here, that of a complaining witness who allegedly made prior statements inconsistent with material parts of her trial testimony. In this common situation, settled rules allow defendanyts to present extrinsic impeachment evidence after laying a proper foundation. But that extrinsic evidence is admissable so that the jury can properly evaluate the impeached witness's trial testimony; it is not "proof of what happened." Fundamental as it is, the right to present a defense "does not give criminal defendants carte blanche to circumvent the rules of evidence." (cites cases.)
The entire decision may be reviewed at www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_06971.htm
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